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In the second part of this blog, Dr Kalpana Wilson explores the connections between the activities of Hindu
supremacist groups in Britain, particular forms of development taking place in India, and dominant currents of British
racism. Click here for Part 1, which argues that growing interest in the role of diasporas in development is related to
specific strategies of capital and the consolidation of neoliberal policies.
The Sangh Parivar, the umbrella organisation of far-right Hindu supremacist groups in India, has actively targeted
the Indian diaspora in the UK from the 1980s onwards , and now draws upon it extensively for moral and, more
importantly, material support for its project of establishing India as a Hindu rashtra or state. By setting up groups
claiming to represent Hindu ‘faith communities’, the Sangh Parivar in Britain has also accessed government funding.
Pro-Hindutva groups in Britain also forged strong links with both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party. For
example, in 2001, Labour MP for Brent North Barry Gardiner of the Labour Friends of India visited Gujarat where he
personally presented Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Chief Minister Narendra Modi with a cheque for one million
pounds collected in Britain by the charity Sewa International for earthquake relief.
Within the discourses of Hindutva, Muslims, and Muslim men in particular, are identified as the primary threat to the
nation, and made to symbolically represent a series of interlinked tropes including terrorism, fanaticism, allegiance
to forces external and hostile to the nation, illegal immigration, population growth, and women’s subordination.
Indian ‘national interests’ within these hyper-nationalist discourses revolve around the perceived threat from
Pakistan and  focus on Kashmir, and the bodies of Kashmiris, as the territory over which Indian ‘integrity’ must be
violently reproduced. Clearly, this has multiple intersections with the post-Cold War shift which identified Islam as the
new enemy of ‘Western civilisation’ and, post-9/11, the US-led ‘War on Terror’; the anti-Muslim racism which has
become central following realignments in the dominant discourses of British racism; and the changes in the British
state’s approaches to ‘race’ which underpinned the emergence of the ‘Community Cohesion’ agenda.
This convergence was evident in February 2007 when Ramesh Kallidai and the Hindu Forum of Britain (of which
Hindu Aid is an offshoot) made allegations of ‘forced conversions’ of ‘hundreds’ of ‘Hindu and Sikh girls’ by ‘Muslim
extremists’ at British universities. The allegation of forced conversions of young women is part of an arsenal of
myths propagated by the Hindu right in India to incite violence against minority communities: inflammatory leaflets
making these claims were in circulation immediately before the massacres of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. In fact the
notion of Hindu women needing protection from predatory Muslim men informs the core patriarchal-nationalist
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narrative of Hindutva, which appeals to Hindu men to reassert their masculinity through the performance of sexual
and other forms of extreme violence against minority groups. In this case, however, Metropolitan Police
Commissioner Ian Blair, who was a guest at the conference where the claims were made, seized the opportunity to
commit his force to action, despite the absence of any evidence for such ‘conversions’. Blair’s remarks were duly
reported widely in the media. Yet a few months later, the police were reportedly unable to cite a single such case.
But the symbiotic relationship between Hindu supremacist ideology in Britain and the dominant currents of British
racism represents more than simply a coincidental overlapping of demonisations or even a conjunctural
convergence of different actors’ political goals. To understand this, we need to look at processes of globalisation,
development and imperialism, and how both twenty-first century British racism and contemporary Hindutva are
shaped by, and in turn impact upon, these processes. The emergence of Hindutva forces as an effective political
force in India from the beginning of the 1990s has been inextricably related to the restructuring of capital in the era of
neoliberal globalisation and the Indian state’s embrace of policies of economic liberalisation.
It is in Gujarat, which has been ruled by the BJP with Narendra Modi as chief minister since 2001, that the
connections between the ideology of Hindutva and corporate capital are perhaps most evident. The Gujarat
genocide of 2002 has not stood in the way of Modi’s self-projection as ‘Vikas-Purush’ (Man of Development). The
development policies pursued, in which swathes of land and coastline have been converted into Special Economic
Zones (and latterly ‘Special Investment Regions’) and handed over to corporates heavily subsidised by the state
have meant that high levels of growth in relation to the rest of India have been accompanied by nutrition poverty
levels higher than all-India levels; according to the recent “ India Chronic Poverty Report”, Gujarat is currently one of
the states with the highest incidence of child malnutrition among the poor. It has also seen severe curtailment of
labour rights, all under the shadow of the continuing activities of Hindu supremacist organisations, as a result of
which many Muslim families driven from their homes in 2002 remain in camps unable to return safely.
As a result of this development model, while the BJP is often still viewed as the party of small-scale domestic
business and trade due to its core vote base, it is now the ruling party of choice for large sections of Indian and
transnational corporate capital.  With ongoing indictments against him for the 2002 genocide, Narendra Modi has
been endorsed as the best person to be the next prime minister by India’s leading corporate billionaires including
Ratan Tata, Mukesh Ambani, and Sunil Mittal, the latter claiming that ‘CEO’ Modi “can also run the nation”. Tellingly,
these statements were made at the 2009 Vibrant Gujarat Global Investor Summit. Another guest was British MP
Barry Gardiner, of the pro-Sangh ParivarLabour Friends of India, who went a step further to proclaim, “Gujarat can
lead the world”. Most recently, David Cameron’s Foreign Office took unprecedented steps to ‘rehabilitate’ Modi by
sending the British High Commissioner to Ahmedabad to meet him to ‘explore opportunities for closer cooperation’.
Gujarat has a particular salience in the context of the diaspora in Britain. This is partly because of personal
connections with the state:  most people of Indian origin who identify as Hindu in Britain are from families which
originated in Gujarat and often still have relatives there, although many of these families migrated to Britain via East
Africa. It is also because of the symbolic role the state has come to play within certain discourses as the epitome of
a ‘modern’, developed, and successful India, a construction in which dominant sections of Indian diasporic
communities in Britain are arguably particularly invested. This is conceived in specifically neoliberal terms in which
growing inequality is irrelevant, and persistent poverty invisible. The last decade has seen both the naturalisation of
this approach to development with mainstream political parties in India all adopting it, as well as the institutional
entrenchment of Hindutva-inspired notions of citizenship, something which is much more tenacious than the
fluctuating electoral fortunes of the BJP and its allies.
DfID’s partnership with Hindu supremacist groups in the context of initiatives to involve black and ethnic minority
communities in development is thus consistent with the reconfiguration of the British state’s approach to ‘race’ in the
context of global changes in the 1990s and the War on Terror from 2001 onwards. At the same time, it is premised
on a shared, neoliberal understanding of ‘development’, which involves facilitating the appropriation of land,
resources, and labour by corporate capital. This approach to development has been vigorously promoted in India by
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DfID.
Meanwhile, the fact that Indian capital is playing an increasingly central role in the crisis-ridden British economy  has
only reinforced new representations of India as unproblematically affluent and ‘civilised’ and of its diaspora as loyal
and deserving British citizens. The extent to which ‘Hinduism’ in the racialised discourse of British citizenship has
come to be associated with an assumed allegiance to the ongoing British imperialist project was demonstrated in
October 2011 when Prime Minister David Cameron spoke at a reception for ‘prominent members of the Sikh and
Hindu communities’ hosted at 10 Downing Street to celebrate Diwali. In his first public comments on the lynching of
Colonel Gaddafi by NATO backed forces in Libya earlier that day, Cameron enthused that “Diwali being the festival
of a triumph of good over evil and also the death of a devil, perhaps there is a little resonance in what I am saying
tonight”.
However, these racialised representations overlap and co-exist with, rather than completely displacing, the
representations of ‘Asians’ and India which existed earlier. They do not preclude the continuing reproduction, for
example, of racist media representations of India and Indians as pathologically and comically ‘unhygienic’ or
‘ignorant’. Nor of course do they offer any protection for people of Indian origin in Britain, like Indian student Anuj
Bidve who was shot dead in Salford on Boxing Day 2011. Equally, just as both the violence of the Hindu far-right
and the depredations of corporate capital have been continually resisted in multiple ways in India, in Britain the
activities of the Sangh Parivar described earlier have faced sustained opposition and protest by people of South
Asian origin organising across boundaries, and contesting the British state’s constructions of ‘race’ and ‘community’.
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